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The Indian telecom growth has become a benchmark for other infrastructure sectors in 
India, which are attempting to replicate the telecom success story. Between March 2004-
05, the cumulative position of the number of phones changed from 76.53 million to 98.41 
million phones, recording an impressive growth of 28.59 percent, translating into an 
overall teledensity of 9.11. We attempt to provide some perspective to this growth story. 
Despite these promising gains, many rural areas in India remain un-served by any 
communications network, fixed line or mobile. This is evident in the wide disparities in 
the rural and urban direct exchange lines (DELs). As on March 31, 2005, the total urban 
DELs were 32.74 million and rural DELs including Village Public Telephones (VPTs) 
were 13.45 million. Crudely, this means that 30 percent of the population had a little 
more than 70 percent of the phones and 70 percent of the population had less than 30 
percent of the phones. Moreover, the overall teledensity figure does not reveal the huge 
gap between the urban and rural teledensity at 26.2 percent and 1.74 percent 
respectively. According to TRAI (2004), the prime reason for slow growth in rural 
telephony is the increased focus on cellular mobile infrastructure deployment after 2001-
02 and reduction in fixed line and rural investment. The mobile sector grew at 55 percent 
in comparison to a 7.82 percent growth of fixed line between March 2004-05. Also, most 
of the rural DELs installed by BSNL have been funded by the government through 
license fees relief. Original licensees did have contractual obligations for the installation 
of DELs and a certain number of public phones in the villages. However, not a single 
operator has met its commitment. As against their commitment of establishing public 
phones in about 98,000 villages; they have in fact covered only about 12,000 villages. 
They rather opted to pay the penalty amount of Rs. 53 crores1 in order to avoid their 
contractual obligations. 
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Operators Area of Operation 31
st March 2005 
   Urban Rural Total 
1 BSNL All India (Except Delhi & Mumbai) 23,601,383 13,434,142 37,035,525 




Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, Haryana, 
Tamil Nadu, Chennai, Karnataka, 
Gujarat, Punjab, Maharashtra, 
Mumbai, U.P. (W) including 
Uttranchal, West Bengal and Kolkata 





Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil 
Nadu, Chennai, Karnataka, Gujarat, 
Delhi, Bihar, Orissa, Rajasthan, 
Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, U.P.(E), U.P. 
(W) including Uttaranchal, West 
Bengal and Kolkata 




Karnataka, Gujarat, Delhi, Bihar, 
Orissa, Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, 
Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, U.P. (E), U.P. (W) including 
Uttranchal, West Bengal and Kolkata 








Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Mumbai, Orissa, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, 
Chennai, U.P. (E), U.P.(W), West 
Bengal, Kolkata 
1,302,008 8791 1,310,799 
Grand Total 32,744,603 13,453,422 46,198,025 
Source:  Performance Indicators, TRAI, June, 2005. 
 
Moreover, as in many developing countries the telecom growth in India, has been 
fuelled by wireless growth. The subscriber base of 52.22 million wireless service users (as 
on March 31, 2005) outstripped the subscriber base of 46.19 million of fixed service users. 
In the absence of empirical data regarding the percentage of all wireless subscribers that 
do not have fixed access (either at home or at work) higher subscriber base and hence 
teledensity does not necessarily translate into higher access. There is no reliable data to 
ascertain the extent to which mobile networks are actually reaching to those households 
that do not have any access to telecommunications or are simply providing access 
opportunities to households that are already a part of the network. It will not be wrong 
to conjecture that the majority of the mobile network expansion is serving the already 
connected. 
 
If one compares the Indian telecom growth story with that of China, the overall picture 
does not appear to be so promising either. Notwithstanding all the liberalisation and 
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growth in mobile telephones with teledensity (both mobile and fixed) 9.26 percent2 
today, India is still far behind. The fact remains that China had 344 million mobile users 
and another 319 million fixed line subscribers in February 2005, which translated into a 
teledensity of 25.9 per cent for mobiles and another 24.9 percent for fixed lines or 50.8 
percent in all.  
 
While a conducive regulatory and policy environment can improve network expansion, 
it is well recognized that rural telephony and extending telephony to the poor is 
necessarily prone to market failure. If the market fails on account of network 
externalities then there is a case to intervene in the market to serve these specific groups 
of people who have a low willingness to pay. Provision of rural telephones and their 
maintenance is expensive. The terrain is tough, demand is low, ability to pay limited and 
revenues generated often abysmally low. Consequently, the service has almost to be 
subsidised, though experts believe that much of rural communications can be viable in a  




                                                          
2 Estimate based on April 30, 2005 data, fixed lines are 46 million and mobile 53.65 million 



















Tax Policies: Onerous license fees
Number portability
Connectivity of Wireless operators to  carry inter -circle calls
Future
Unified access license regime introduced to enhance
competition and create a level playing field
Transfer of Wireless licenses allowed among operators
Intra -circle Wireless mergers allowed
IUC regime implemented
Lowering of ADC from 30% to 10% of the revenue
2003-05
1999-2002
New Telecom Policy introduced
Entry of third and fourth operators in Wireless services
Free competition allowed in Wireline: WLL Introduced
NLD & ILD opened up to competition
First round of tariff rebalancing done: TTO
Operators moved from fixed to revenue -sharing license fee
TRAI established as an independent regulatory body
Wireless licenses allotted to private operators
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In this paper we propose to review the current subsidy mechanism for expansion of 
rural telephony in India. This mechanism is implemented through two instruments: 
(a) Universal Service Fund (USF), a non lapsable fund created through a statute to 
finance network expansion in net high cost rural areas. The disbursement from 
this fund is made through a competitive least-cost subsidy mechanism. and; 
(b) Access Deficit Charge (ADC), which is a surcharge on interconnection fees to 
compensate [primarily] the incumbent for rental/local call charges, special 
concessionary local call charges in rural areas, provision of free calls, and any 
other below cost tariffs that the regulator may need to specify to make the basic 
telecom services affordable to the common man to promote both universal 
service and universal access as per NTP’99. 
How well have these instruments fared and what have been the associated problems in 
their implementation? Do these instruments stand the test of an efficient subsidy scheme 
i.e. are they well targeted and create the least possible market distortion? What level of 
competition exists in their allocation, are some questions that this paper addresses. The 
paper is divided into two main sections. Section I of the paper provides the theoretical 
framework to analyse the universal service obligations (USO) including the issues of 
financing and disbursement. Documenting the status of USO in India and a critical 
analysis of the issues related to it follows this. There are important, higher level and 
strategic issues associated with USO: the impact of mobile telephony and broadband; the 
operation of USO in a competitive market? These issues are discussed in this section.  
The second section discusses the objective and the subsequent design and 
implementation of the ADC regime.  It discusses the many issues that arose during its 
implementation and identifies the causes for the same; essentially it’s over complexity.  It 
thereafter analyses the current status of the ADC regime and postulates a number of 
questions that need answers by the regulator.  The section ends by providing some 
possible solutions.  The discussion is based on the many pieces of information publicly 
available on the pros and cons of ADC.   
 
1.1  Rationale for Universal Service Obligations 
 
There are several reasons given for imposing universal service obligations (USOs). First, 
it is often thought that utilities such as electricity, water and telecommunications services 
are necessities that should be readily available to all, simply on the grounds of equity. 
This argument can be supplemented with the idea that poor communications is one of 
the principal impediments in the path, not only of rapid economic growth, but also of 
development in its broader sense, including poverty alleviation. Under such 
circumstances USO can be seen as a special case of redistributive pricing, that is a policy 
meant to affect redistribution through prices instead of (or in addition to) income 
taxation and/or direct transfers. From that perspective it bears some similarities with 
policies involving public provision of private goods, in-kind transfers etc. The basic 
feature of these policies is that some essentially private goods like education, child care 
or health care are provided either free of charges or at subsidized prices (Cremer, Gasmi, 
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Economic literature, however, cautions that such policies are optimal in a second-best 
setting; that is when the policy makers do not have the necessary information to 
implement (potentially) more efficient policies like direct transfers. However, more 
importantly, there may be significant positive externalities associated with a service 
(such as a communication network) that the market, left unregulated, would fail to 
incorporate, leading to insufficient coverage of the network. A USO may be required to 
correct for this market failure. 
 
The equity argument for USO is increasingly being used by policymakers around the 
world who deem telecommunications as a basic necessity of citizens, essential to full 
participation in the ‘new information economy’. Thus, universal access is the goal 
adopted by many developing countries to provide convenient and affordable access to 
communications, at least on a community basis, through a combination of private and 
public access facilities such as payphones and telecentres. On the other hand in many 
developed countries USO not only includes access to a PSTN, but also to directory, 
selective outgoing call barring to premium service, emergency services and installation 
of payphones. In these countries, increasingly, USO also includes internet access to 
public schools and libraries at discounted prices. In developing countries, the focus 
continues to be on basic voice services. 
 
The universal service strategy can be envisaged as focusing on two separate ‘gaps’, 
addressed with quite different mechanisms (Navas-Sabater, Dymond, and Juntunen 
2002): 
•  The market efficiency gap is the difference between what markets actually 
achieve under current conditions, and what they can achieve if market barriers 
are removed. This gap can be bridged through effective competition, private 
provision of service, and market-oriented policies and regulations that create a 
level playing field for new entrants. 
•  The access gap – refers to the people and places which remain beyond the limits 
of the market unless additional investments are mobilized through intervention, 
in the form of subsidies to encourage service providers to enter.  
 
In the past, monopoly operators had to assume the costs of meeting the country’s 
universal access objectives. These operators had to finance the delivery of essential 
telephone services to uneconomic regions mainly through cross subsidies, which accrued 
from profitable market segments (e.g. international, long-distance, business users, urban) 
to less profitable market segments (e.g. domestic, local, residential users, rural). While 
cross-subsidies served their purpose in monopoly environments, they created problems 
in newly competitive environments. In particular, cross-subsidies have been known to 
distort market signals and place an unfair burden on certain operators. To finance their 
access objectives in a competitively neutral and transparent manner, an increasing 
number of countries are now turning to universal access funds.  
 
However, some recent writings in economic literature on USO have questioned the 
justification of USO on equity grounds, since there may be better tools to achieve 
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service programs. They can reduce the risk that customers may not subscribe to a 
network since they do not take into account the benefit they confer on existing users. 
Even if the marginal consumer confers a small externality, this has to be multiplied by 
large numbers. But it has also been pointed out there are also limits to this kind of 
justification for subsidies. While externalities may present reasons to intervene in 
principle, in practice any such intervention is likely to prove counterproductive. Even if 
such market failures exist, however, government should intervene only when the 
expected benefits of doing so outweigh the potential costs. That is, government should 
try to correct a market failure only when the risks of “government failure” are low. 
(Crandall, Hahn, Litan, and Wallsten 2004). Moreover, it may not be also obvious that 
the operators will not internalize the presence of these externalities and not expand their 
network suo moto. The operator may in fact find it profitable to coordinate consumers. 
 
Whatever maybe the motivation for a USO, subsidies should be at the margin and it is 
not necessary to subsidize the majority of infra-marginal customers that would be on the 
network without any inducement. In this respect, targeted programs fare much better 
than uniform subsidies. Moreover, USOs are blunt instruments, for instance in the 
Indian context, USOs are aimed at the rural customers and a USO to cover high-cost 
rural areas might benefit high-income rural consumers at the expense of low-income 
urban consumers. Policymakers and regulators have to be careful with USOs since they 
tend to be used by market players to extract too many concessions. Ironically, the 
existence and scope of USO could also be a result of regulatory capture. There can be 
situations where the incumbent operator itself may use its leverage on the regulator to 
maintain a stringent USO as this may justify some of its privileges, e.g., monopoly 
protection in some market segments (Cremer, Gasmi, Grimaud and Laffont 2001). Recent 
research has also shown that USOs have important strategic implications and affect the 
way firms compete against each other. The design of the USO and its financing 
mechanism may affect the very nature of competition that can be sustained in the sector.  
It can affect the viability of the existing operators as well as the entry process in the 
industry. Thus it is important that countries should distinguish clearly between 
universal availability and universal service guarantees. The former is promoted by 
encouraging investments and removing entry barriers. Only the latter should be 
explicitly linked to possible costing and financing requirements. European Commission 
in its 1999 review recognized that universal service, and in particular universal service 
funds, are a real cost and a form of cross-subsidization, and therefore should not be used 
unless necessary. Other than France no other member state has an explicit universal 
service fund. The 1999 review also mentioned the possibility of abolishing the 
authorization of universal service funds, or conversely establishing “pay or play” 
schemes for universal service support. Second, the approach towards universal service 
should be technologically neutral, enabling wireline and wireless technologies to be used 
to provide services. It is important to maintain incentives for competing networks and/or 
technologies to provide (part of) the universal service provisions (Hoernig and Valletti 
2002). 
 
Another important consideration is that competition and universal service requirements 
based on cross-subsidies are at odds with each other, under these circumstances 
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the previous goals of guaranteeing a basic service in the new environment. Second, their 
design must explicitly take account of their impact on competition. One stated aim of the 
policy maker should be to devise policies that are ‘competitively neutral’, i.e. do not 
influence competition and let the market determine the efficient allocation of services. 
One of the oft adopted method of granting subventions placing companies in 
competition through a system of inverse bids, allowing considerable savings to be made 
as the bidder requiring the lowest subvention is the winner. 
 
1.2  Issues in financing and disbursement of USF  
 
USO although necessary, (once the policymaker has decided to use this instrument to 
expand subscription base) but is also costly and someone has to pay for it. When 
devising USO policies, governments must resolve the issue of the amount of money 
needed to fund the USO. This was not an issue under the traditional subsidy system. 
Financing these costs imposes distortions and regulators should try to minimize losses of 
allocative efficiency. The least distortionary way to finance net costs is probably from the 
government central budgets. Alternatively, funding should be recovered within the 
sector, raising a tax from the broadest possible base, in order to minimize the impact of 
the financial burden falling on end-users. Universal service taxes of this kind are more 
transparent in comparison to access surcharges as the financing of universal service is 
clearly separated from the issues such as (marginal) cost of access, the financing of 
network’s fixed costs, which may affect the determination of access charges. The choice 
between funding from central budgets as opposed to universal service tax depends to a 
great extent on the efficiency of the tax system. Moreover, once introduced theses 
obligations become permanent because of the political difficulty in eliminating them; 
and therefore should be small and funded out of general revenues — not through a tax 
on telecommunications services — to minimize the cost to the economy. 
 
Even the best USF Administrators will generally have less information than 
telecommunications operators about the real costs and benefits of implementing rural 
public access telecommunications projects. Therefore competitive bidding approaches 
have been used to determine the actual subsidy amount disbursed for each project. 
Competitive bidding has the advantage of generally reducing the total funding required 
to meet universal access objectives. The actual winning bid amounts awarded in Latin 
American programmes were generally well below the maximum subsidy amount 
calculated by the USF Administrator to be required to provide service. In Chile, over the 
1995-1999 period, the average winning subsidy was about 50% of the maximum subsidy 
offered. Similarly, in Peru, in 1999-2000, the average winning subsidy has been about 
25% of the maximum subsidy offered. In the first set of projects auctioned in Colombia in 
2000 the average winning subsidy was 45% of the maximum subsidy offered. 
 
There are benefits from using auctions to assign USOs since the regulator does not need 
to calculate net costing. It also provides a useful means of testing whether or not there 
exists a net universal service cost of serving uneconomic areas. There are also problems. 
It may be difficult to have sufficient participants bidding against the incumbent (in many 
cases entrants would need to use alternative infrastructure or acquire the use of the 
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In practice, only the operators that have or willing to invest in, a costly infrastructure in 
the area in question might be interested in participating in the auction. Thus, a critical 
assumption of the success of these auctions is that they should be genuinely competitive, 
may be violated in practice. Another reason is the asymmetry of information between 
the incumbents and new entrants, for example concerning the costs and benefits of 
serving groups of customers. Large disaggregated data is required to evaluate the net 
cost of universal service; the incumbent may be at an advantage, when formulating the 
size of its bid. Moreover, as has been pointed out earlier, because of high infrastructure 
costs, few operators compete with the incumbent. Under such circumstances arises 
another regulatory and policy issue, as to have the incumbent lease its infrastructure to 
potential universal service providers. Even if it is legally and practically feasible to do so, 
it may still put the incumbent in an advantageous position when bidding against 
operators relying on transfer or lease of assets from their competitor (Cremer et al. 2001). 
If an auction is not feasible due to the reasons described then the regulator must 
calculate the net cost and then proceed to financing requirements. 
 
1.3  Universal Service Obligation in India 
 
The New Telecom Policy ’99 (NTP’99) envisaged provision of access to basic telecom 
services to all at affordable and reasonable prices. Universal Service was one of the main 
objectives of NTP’99. Section 6.0 of the policy has laid down the following specific 
Universal Service targets: 
• Provide voice and low speed data service to the balance 2.9 lakh uncovered villages 
in the country by the year 2002  
• Achieve Internet access to all district head quarters by the year 2000  
• Achieve telephone on demand in urban and rural areas by 2002  
 
In addition NTP’99 has also set the following targets:  
• Encourage development of telecom in rural areas making it more affordable by 
suitable tariff structure and making rural communication mandatory for all fixed 
service providers.  
• Increase rural teledensity from the current level of 0.4 to 4 by the year 2010 and 
provide reliable transmission media in all rural areas.  
• Achieve telecom coverage of all villages in the country and provide reliable media to 
all exchanges by the year 2002.  
• Provide high speed data and multimedia capability using technologies including 
ISDN to all  
 
Keeping in line with NTP’99, the recommendations of Telecom Regulatory Authority of 
India (TRAI) on the issues relating to the Universal Service Obligation were sought. 
TRAI defines USO in the Indian context using the following three parameters: 
• Availability: provision of telephone services whenever and wherever required even 
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• Accessibility: Non-discriminatory tariff in the service area regardless of the 
geographic location. Non-discrimination in terms of service quality, price (imposing 
of a uniform pricing constraint) 
• Affordability: Telephone service to be prices so that it is affordable to most users  
 
Based on the decisions taken on the recommendations, the Universal Service Support 
Policy was framed. The Universal Service Support Policy has come into force from April 
1, 2002. The implementation of Universal Service Support Policy is based on Indian 
Telegraph Act 1885 as amended by Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Act, 2004 (No. 8 of 
2004) and the rules framed there under (See Annex 1 for the broad guidelines for the 
implementation of the Universal Support Policy). On January 9, 2004, the Universal 
Service Fund (USF) got a statutory non-lapsable status with the passing of the Indian 
Telegraph (Amendment) Act, 2004. The Act states 
  
“Universal Service Obligation” means the obligation to provide access to basic telegraph services 
to people in rural and remote areas at affordable and reasonable prices”  
 
Universal access funds can differ in their management. While some funds (e.g. 
Colombia) are administered by government ministries, other funds are administered by 
the regulators (e.g. Peru, Chile) or special agencies (e.g. South Africa). The common 
perception is that funds administered by independent regulators and agencies are less 
likely to be influenced by government or political interest. In India the USF is 
administered as a separate administrative organization set up as an attached office of the 
Department of Telecom (DoT) even though options of an Independent 
Authority/Regulator were considered for administering the fund. The universal service 
fund is based on an implicit assumption that competition among private providers will 
not generate service in rural areas without subsidies.   
 
Prior to this the collections from USL for USO went to the Consolidated Fund of India. 
Thus despite operators having made contributions towards the fulfillment of the 
universal service obligations, network expansion was slow, as the funds were not 
released. However, giving a statutory status to the USF has gone a long way in 
expediting the disbursements and thereby effectuating the universal service policy. The 
resources for meeting the Universal Service Obligation (USO) are generated through a 
Universal Service Levy (USL), which is a percentage of the revenue earned by the 
operators under various licenses. The Universal Service Levy presently is 5% of the 
Adjusted Gross Revenue earned by all the operators except pure value added service 
providers like internet service providers, voice mail, e-mail etc.  In addition to this any 
grants and loan made by the Central Government from time to time will also be used to 
fund.  However, transfers to the USF are through appropriation by Parliament.  
  
Almost USD 2 billion corpus is expected for the USF disbursement schemes during the 
10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007). Till March 2005 Rs.6000 crores (almost USD 1.3 billion) 
had been contributed to the USF. The following table documents the disbursement 
schedule from the USF till March 2005. Almost 50 percent of the amount collected is 
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been successful in a speedy implementation of projects from the date of the inception of 
the USO policy. TRAI has recommended a speedier disbursement of funds as USO 
disbursements and the ADC requirements are linked inextricably. With smooth and 
early disbursement of USO funds, the amount of ADC funding required will keep going 
down, because the methodology used by TRAI is such that as the USO funding 
increases, the amount of ADC funding requirement decreases. Thus it is extremely 
important that the amount of USO funds collected by the Government should be 
disbursed for this purpose by providing the amounts to the USF Administrator. 
Otherwise while the USO funds would be collected by the Government from the license 
fee, but due to their non-disbursement, it will not be possible to reduce the ADC charge 
by the maximum amount possible, and the consumer will continue to bear a relatively 
higher ADC burden. 
 
Table 2: Disbursement Schedule for the USO funds 
Year Amount Disbursed/ Provision 
2002-2003 Rs. 300 crores (66 million USD) of the Rs.1653 crores (USD 367 million) collected  
2003-2004 Rs. 200 crores (44 million USD) of the estimated Rs. 2143 crores (476 million USD)  
collected  
2004-2005 Rs. 1200 crores (266 million USD) of the estimated Rs. 2800 crores (636 million USD)  
collected 
2005-2006* Rs. 1200 crores (266 million USD) 
Note: * Provided for in the Union Budget for the fiscal year 2005-06 
 
In order to disburse the collected funds, a least cost subsidy auction mechanism has been 
adopted. The bidding process for the provision of rural household direct exchange lines 
(RDELs) in specified short distance charging areas (SDCAs) is summarized in Annex 2. 
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Table 3:  Status of various USO Projects in India  
Project Implementation Dates Comments 
Operation and Maintenance of Village 
Public Telephones (VPTs) in the 
revenue villages identified as per 
Census 1991. Approximately 520,000 
villages 
March, 2003 
This includes support for 9171 VPTs 
installed by the Six Private BSO and 
remaining 5,09,775 VPTs installed by 
BSNL. This provides coverage of more 
than 90% of the villages where VPTs. 
are to be provided. Firms participating 
in this auction bid exactly the 
benchmark. 
Replacement of Multi Access Radio 
Relay Technology VPTs installed 
before 1st April 2002. 1, 80,000 MARR 
VPTs 
September, 2003 
Since the VPTs were mainly BSNL’s, 
the subsidy went to BSNL with a zero 
cost reduction, bid exactly the 
benchmark 
Provision of additional rural 
community phones (RCPs) in areas 
after achieving the target of one VPT 
in every revenue village (2nd VPT). 
46,253 RCPs.  
September 30, 2004 
Out of 300 Secondary Switching Areas 
(SSAs), BSNL was the successful 
bidder in 184, Reliance Infocom won 
97. Competition between two service 
providers in only 115 SSAs. The 
competitive bidding has resulted in 
bringing down the cost of the project 
by about 17% from the reserve price 
 
 
Provision of VPTs in revenue villages 
as per Census 1991 without any 
public telephone facility. No. of 
villages covered : 66,822 
November, 10, 2004 
BSNL emerged successful for 12 
service areas where six companies 
participated, BSNL had one-to-one 
competition with Bharti Cellular Ltd 
(BCL) in three service areas –Andhra 
Pradesh, Orissa and UP (West), 
comprising 6,221 VPTs (village public 
telephones), As a result of the 
competition in these three service 
areas, there was a reduction of 15-20 
per cent in the overall subsidy to be 
given for VPTs. in the nine service 
areas BSNL was the sole bidder. 
Hence, BSNL emerged the winner in 
all the Service Areas 
Provision of rural household direct 
exchange lines (rdels) in specified 
short distance charging areas 
March 15,  2005 
The project covers 274 (SSAs), 
competitive bidding in 215 SSAs, 
BSNL emerged the most successful 
bidder winning in 171 SSAs across 19 
States, Reliance Infocomm emerged 
the winner in 61 SSAs spread across 15 
States while Tata Teleservices got the 
project in 42 SSAs across 9 States,  
competitive bids have brought down 
the cost of the project by 60-75 per cent 
 Source: Collated from economic press and interviews with USF officials 
 
In addition to the above nearly 8.6 million rural DELs, which had been installed prior to 
1.4.2002 are being supported by the USF. The support is for differential in TRAI 
prescribed rental and the rental actually charged and is for the period 1.4.2002 to 
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documents and working out the benchmarks for the remaining activity under USO; viz; 
installation of PTICs and HPTICs falling under Stream-I of the USO policy. Considering 
the requirement to involve outside agencies by the service providers for running and 
maintaining the kiosks, development of content and identification of sites for a viable 
business proposition, it has been decided to take up on a pilot basis for about 2000 
villages.  (www.dot.nic.in) 
 
1.4  Key issues of India’s universal service programme 
 
Having outlined the status of the universal service projects and their implementation, we 
briefly discuss some of the key issues of the nature and the implementation of the 
Universal Service policy.  
 
1.4.1 Eligibility for support 
An issue which requires attention in the Indian context is whether the USF should support 
individual/private rural telephones or should it be restricted to payphones. The USO policy 
had identified the implementation of USO into two clearly identifiable streams: - 
• Stream-I: Provision of Public Telecom and Information services; and 
• Stream-II: Provision of household telephones in identified Net High Cost Areas 
(rural/remote) 
 
While universal service is a realistic policy objective in many industrialised countries, 
universal access is a more practical goal in most developing countries. There is no denial 
of the fact that universal access policies must work to increase access to 
telecommunications services on a shared basis, such as on a community or village-wide 
level. These universal access programs typically promote the installation of public 
payphones or public call offices in rural or remote villages or low-income urban areas 
with the aim of providing a basic and initial connection to the public 
telecommunications network. Thus, the Indian universal service policy has gone beyond 
access and has also incorporated some elements of universal service in as much as it has 
taken the onus of provision of household telephones. Rakesh Mohan, a part-time 
member of TRAI, had favoured restricting USO to public telephones as he feared that 
private rural connections may go to well-off families, which did not deserve the subsidy. 
The other members, however, overruled him. As has been mentioned in the discussion 
above, the funding of universal service is distortionary as it taxes the operators and 
secondly it has strategic implications, the overextending of the universal support has its 
repercussions on the level of competition and in hampering the market based solutions 
to the extension of network to the unreached.   
 
1.4.2 Costing of the benchmark 
The approach adopted by the USF to determine the benchmark for the least cost subsidy 
was a top-down approach, where the capital costs, were obtained mostly form BSNL and 
a few private operators. They were the costs for bulk procurement of latest technology-
based equipment in purchases currently under finalization and in that sense were 
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geocoded data specific to each service area but were based on standard efficiency norms 
for network design. This was quite different form what the regulator had recommended. 
In its recommendations TRAI had pointed out: 
 
“To ensure that BSOs do not over estimate the cost figures of providing an optimal VPT 
connection, the USF Administrator  should quickly develop proxy cost model(s) to assess the most 
optimal cost of providing VPTs based on their location, technology employed, and distance from 
the nearest exchange”. 
  
The Net Cost was calculated as follows: 
 
Net Cost = [{Annualized Capital Recovery + Annual Operating Cost} - {Annual Revenue}]; 
Where Annualized Capital Recovery = Aggregate of depreciation + return on equity plus 
interest on debt. 
 
1.4.3 Scope of USO  
Till recently only fixed wire lines (landline) and wireless in local loop technology (fixed 
WLL), qualified for subsidy support from USO Fund.  By restricting the subsidy support 
to these technologies alone meant that the bidding was not open to different competing 
technologies. In the absence of ex-ante competition (in the presence of a non-liberal and a 
tight licensing regime), it is quite possible that the price discovery (of the appropriate 
subsidy amount) through the subsidy auction was limited. The narrow technology-
centric approach followed so far has not fully exploited the advantages of a well 
designed auction which would reveal carriers’ valuations of the USO, determine the 
number of USO providers endogenously, and hence provide an alternative to traditional 
cost-of-service regulation. In most of the Latin American the countries the mandatory 
services were defined in such a manner that many different types of technologies could 
have been used. In fact, satellite, radio, cellular and wireline technologies, sometimes in 
combination, have been employed successfully to provide mandatory services. 
 
Moreover, by restricting participation in the auction to already existing phone 
companies (in the SSAs) meant that it hugely favoured the incumbent that was 
omnipresent. This exclusivity provision meant that the auction failed to create 
competition for the market. Consequently, the provision of the subsidized service mostly 
by the incumbent, who will receive a large portion of the subsidy will discourage new 
firms from entering [as they will not be able compete without subsidy] and preclude 
competition in the market. The Chilean model of the least cost subsidy auction which has 
become a blueprint for subsidy auctions of the kind followed in India allowed existing as 
well as new operating companies, subject only to minimal legal requirements, to bid. 
Wireless communications is extending the limits of the market place and reaching out 
into areas unserved by the fixed network, often at lower cost. Some funds will find that 
they can target some areas with lower subsidies and lower risks. The mobile explosion 
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According to the eligibility requirements for the participation in the auction, the 
operators were required to bid either for all the eligible SDCAs in a service area or for all 
the eligible SDCAs in one or more SSAs in the Service Area for which they hold a licence 
for running basic / cellular / unified access services. Thus, only those operators who had 
the infrastructure to carry the traffic to all the SDCAs in a given SSA could venture to 
participate in the auctions. The current policy consciously or inadvertently stimulated 
entry of only large companies by mandating a license for the entire circle. This, in turn, 
impeded the entry of small and medium entrepreneurs who might exploit the available 
technologies to evolve creative solutions for rural connectivity. Against this, a policy 
option for enhancing telecom penetration in rural areas is the introduction of a ʺniche 
operatorʺ3 license, which would be allocated to operators providing service only in rural 
areas. These operators shall be allowed to connect to the nearest exchange of the BSNL or 
another existing BSO. They shall be allowed to offer other communication services that a 
village requires, such as cable television and Internet access.  
 
As mentioned earlier, it is important to maintain incentives for competing networks 
and/or technologies to provide the universal service provisions and this has been 
overlooked in the current framework.  Recently, the Department of Telecommunications 
(DoT) has announced that it is in the process of amending the Indian Telegraph Act to 
extend the Universal Service Obligation (USO) fund support to cellular mobile services 
(both GSM and CDMA). As of today, the government is giving USO fund support to 
only the fixed line operators offering services in the rural areas.  The over defining terms 
in the law is a bad idea in a rapidly evolving technology environment, though this 
correction has been suggested it is quite possible that the previous auctions have left 
huge amounts of rents that have been appropriated by the incumbent. In an industry 
that manifests the potential for rapid technological change and innovation, such as 
telecom, an economic analysis of a problem should not focus too narrowly or exclusively 
on the best use of society’s resources from the standpoint of today’s technology and 
resource availability i.e. static economic efficiency but should be viewed from a dynamic 
perspective. The government should, at the most, set basic minimum standards of 
service that any claimant of the fund should meet. Moreover, the proposed amendment 
should be flexible enough to allow upcoming technologies such as WiMax to make use 
of USO funds. 
 
The arguments which have been put to defend this sequential approach to the 
disbursement of the fund proceeds are that the private operators by and large had 
reneged from their roll out obligations by paying the contractual indemnities. Only five 
basic operators were really functional in mid 2002. They were not yet equipped to take 
up a scheme of this dimension covering the whole country as it would have tied up too 
much of their resources. Even though the private operators had built essential facilities 
the network was not as widespread as the incumbent. Mobile operators who were also 
eligible to quote were even less equipped and inclined as they were focusing 
understandably on cities; extending their network of towers to the more remote areas 
would have been time and resource consuming.   
                                                          
3 The concept has been introduced by TRAI, in its recommendations to the MC&IT on Unified licenses on 
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Funds had started accruing to the USO; if they remained unspent, there would be 
understandable criticism of the whole scheme. The target to connect every village in the 
country had already been pushed back twice or thrice from 1999 to March 2002 and the 
politically acceptable revision of target would not go beyond March 2003. So here was a 
stark choice between waiting for the market to mature so as to discover the prices 
through competition and pushing the scheme so that the population in the most 
backward of regions (populating the equivalent of the entire population of the US) has 
one slender link of connectivity to the outside world. 
 
1.4.4 Issues related to Infrastructure Sharing 
The commercial, legal and regulatory implications of the fact that the incumbent had a 
fair amount of network in place were not taken into account while designing and 
implementing the auction. TRAI in its consultation paper on rural telephony has 
acknowledged the existence of a massive fiber optic network within the country, 
amounting to 6.7 lakh of route km. However, the critical questions are whether the 
geographical coverage is adequate, whether all this fiber is lit and in use, and whether 
there is an effective, non-discriminatory and cost-based access regime for the use of this 
capacity by all operators, especially the new entrants. (In fact according to the eligibility 
requirements, for participating in the auction, it was specified that the sole responsibility 
to set up infrastructure for providing these rural household DELs in all the identified 
SDCAs of the service area was of the bidders.) Unless such a regime exists and is 
enforced, it is extremely difficult for operators without large subscriber bases in the rural 
areas to enter those markets in a cost-effective way. Indeed, if such an access regime does 
not exist, it may even be possible to conclude that it constitutes an anticompetitive 
barrier in the rural markets. Unless the fiber is actually used, we are talking about vanity 
investments by the incumbent (LIRNEasia 2004).  
 
TRAI also notes that BSNL already has 30,000 exchanges, which are connected by fibre. 
This implies an average of 4-5 exchanges per block are connected by fibre. In addition, 
private operators like Tata, Reliance and Bharti have laid their own new networks. 
Leased line providers like Railways, Power-Grid and GAIL have also laid large optic 
fibre networks. Most of this capacity has not been lit. It is evident that by using the 
existing infrastructure, it would be possible to connect the entire country without 
sizeable incremental investment. Lighting up fibre optical network is only 20 per cent of 
the costs of laying down the network. For extending the fibre connectivity up to each 
village, wireless connectivity including WiFi/Wi-Max or in some cases just tapping 
existing fibre could be considered. Thus there are enough existing resources in the 
country to launch major internet, broadband, telephone connectivity and e-Governance 
projects. However, this has to be done in the most economically viable, efficient and 
beneficial manner. Thus, it is essential that under these circumstances it might be prudent 
to have regulatory certainty on the issue of how the incumbent will be asked to share its 
infrastructure and what is the efficient way of doing the same. This is very important, as 
there are significant costs to consumer welfare that a subsidy laden universal service 
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Issues of infrastructure sharing do not lend themselves to any ʺcookie cutterʺ solutions 
and the regulator indeed has to tread carefully in these matters. Many tradeoffs are 
involved and the final solution has to keep in mind the incentive structure that the 
regulations will produce. Our view is that it all depends on the details and on the 
presence of alternative infrastructures (eg cable). In the US mandatory unbundling 
(UNE-P) did not work as they did ʺtoo muchʺ, so entrants could just sit on the 
incumbentʹs network. The European perspective is that some unbundling is necessary as 
otherwise youʹll never be able to create competition, however at some stage entrants 
must have their own facilities. This is sometimes referred to as the ʺladder of 
investmentsʺ, so unbundling can help move up the ladder. Unbundling should be one of 
the several tools in the policy makerʹs arsenal of pro-entry policies that will hopefully 
lead to facilities based infrastructure competition (on either a wholesale or vertically 
integrated basis). Once this demand is realised and facilities based competition exists, in 
that case, mandatory asymmetrical unbundling should, in theory, no longer necessary4. 
Precaution should be taken that unbundling should not be used to create a static 
incumbent centric perpetual resale model, where everybody purchases their primary 
input from a single monopoly provider. Unbundling can be viewed as a two-stage 
process. In the first stage unbundling should be used to stimulate new alternative non-
incumbent demand. In the second stage new facilities based entry should be encouraged 
to serve this consolidated demand.  
 
1.4.5 Market “Efficiency” Gaps 
The future sustainability of the universal service rests crucially on removing regulatory 
barriers to competition, which in turn depend upon on a liberal and a minimalist licensing 
regime. The licenses create a situation of artificial scarcity, and allow the licensor to enjoy 
monopoly rents in its capacity as a provider of the licenses. The solution, as has been 
pointed out by TRAI chairman, is that let the licenses, where you must have them, be 
automatic authorizations. The entry of more firms is the sine qua non of the universal 
service. Though the regulator has tried to address some of the restrictive licensing issues 
in its recommendations to the DoT on unified licensing, the policy maker is yet to 
announce the policy for the same.  
 
Attempts have also to be made to alter the structure of the industry, in such a way to 
make entry profitable, and therefore, viable competition more likely. The US experience 
has shown that without entry, competition in the local exchange market will remain 
nothing else but an ephemeral dream and a fabrication of the incumbent monopolist and 
their representatives. A legislation that reduces entry barriers can increase the number of 
firms in the industry. One way to make entry profitable is to change the industry 
structure such that there is an alternative distribution company, which sells loop and 
other network services to all the service providers on a non-discriminatory basis in direct 
competition with the incumbent local exchange carrier. This will also incentivise the 
incumbent to divest voluntarily its loop functions from its marketing functions, because 
                                                          
4 From a transaction cost perspective a more efficient alternative would be to impose mandatory divestiture 
of the incumbentʹs loop plant from its marketing arm, rather than imposing stringent price, conduct and 
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it will simply find it more efficient to do this under a new market structure. It is not 
unreasonable to conceive of an industry structure, where a new entrant is not a service 
provider but a provider of all infrastructure network elements and would therefore act 
as a competitive and ubiquitous alternative wholesale distribution company. This will 
create incentives for the incumbent to put its own infrastructure for third party use when 
under competitive pressure rather than imposing a regulatory fiat to divest its loop 
(Naftel and Spiwak 2000). 
Another important regulatory barrier to entry is the endogenous costs of doing business 
on account of the onerous burden of various license fees and taxes. Ironically a large 
portion of the license fee goes to fund the universal service fund (See Annex 3.1 to 3.4). 
As shown substantial sums of gross revenue of the operators go to the universal service 
fund. Not only do these huge contributions impose a significant dead weight efficiency 
loss on the consumer welfare but act as a major entry deterrent for the new firms 
especially the small players. This discourages initiatives for rural telephony from local 
cooperatives and small businesses, reflecting a locally based private/public demand pull 
model of network development, rather than a nationally-based supply push model.  
 
Another reason for high demands on the USF stems from the fact that the focus of the 
USF has been just on telephony. Since most of the cost is in the access network (the ‘last 
mile’) it is only commonsense to use the same last mile in a public place for other 
applications (like e-governance, e-learning and tele-medicine) as well. That way, not 
only the revenue opportunities would be enhanced, the local community support would 
come forth unlike the prevailing system where the VPT is usually housed in the house of 
the village chief where about two-third of the locals do not get access – due to reasons 
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2.0 Access Deficit Charge 
 
Given our objective to review the mechanisms for expansion of rural telephony in India, 
we considered the Universal Service Obligation (USO) in the first component of the 
paper.  In this second component, we focus our attention on the Access Deficit Charge 
(ADC). 
   
Internationally, the fundamental principle of ADC is that it is the compensation of the 
difference between the actual cost of providing service and the mandated lower tariffs for 




With the opening up of the Indian telecom service market for private sector participation 
the national and international long distance markets opened up to competition.  These 
policy measures resulted in a significant reduction in long distance tariffs due to 
competitive pressures which reduced margins available to fund the “access deficit” 
incurred by Basic Service Operators (BSO).   
 
In this background the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) considered it 
important to specify a cost-based Interconnection Usage Charge (IUC) regime which 
would give greater certainty to the Interoperator settlement process.  Therefore, TRAI, 
on 24 January 2003 specified an IUC regime on origination, transit and termination.  
ADC was included in the origination and termination usage charges and was made 
payable to BSOs with the intension of keeping the rental and local calls affordable both 
in rural as well as urban areas.   
 
In its original January 2003 notification, TRAI mentioned that “The exercise to determine 
IUCs involved an assessment of the various cost items attributable to the different 
network elements involved in setting up of a call in a multi-operator environment.  
Every effort was made to accurately assess the network element costs based on the 
inputs provided by various operators including the incumbent.”  In fact the 
methodology for these calculations was announced by TRAI in December 2001 and a 
consultation paper on the subject released in September 2002.  As detailed therein IUC 
was to be determined based on minutes of usage for various unbundled network 
elements and the cost of these elements.   
 
TRAI in its notification, calculated the ADC by taking into consideration, what it called 
“an affordable level for rental/local call charges, special concessionary local call charges 
in the rural areas, provision of free calls, and any other below cost tariffs that the 
Regulator may need to specify to make basic telecom services affordable to the common 
man to promote both universal service and universal access as per NTP’99.”   
 
However, calculating the ADC was not straight forward.  In the absence of actual cost 
data, TRAI originally used a proxy model, but could not reconcile the resulting figures 
with the incumbent BSNL internal network element figures that the provider made 
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incumbent (BSNL figures were much higher), TRAI used the 2001-02 balance sheet of 
BSNL that was publicly available.  In calculating the ADC, TRAI used what it called a 
“reasonable return on the investment made”, i.e. a return on capital employed of 13.78%.  
Estimating minutes attributable to various network elements was a challenge in the face 
of unavailability of actual operator data.  TRAI therefore used BSNL submissions as per 
April 2002 and set the long-distance minutes of usage as 22% of total minutes for the 
ADC calculations.  Another decision by TRAI when calculating the ADC was to exclude 
the reimbursements BSNL got from the Government for revenue share license fees and 
spectrum charges they had paid, on the grounds that these cost items depended upon 
revenues earned.   
 
The result of these calculations, was to arrive at a cost based monthly rental to be INR 
424.  Given the data from BSNL showing the incumbant’s recovery on account of 
monthly rental was in the range of INR 165 to INR 175 per month, TRAI proposed the 
unmet amount of INR 249 to INR 259 per month per DEL need to be recovered through 
ADC.  By also including free calls that had to be included in the standard tariff packages, 
the per minute ADC was calculated to be INR 1.00 for local calls and INR 1.00 plus the 
long distance carriage charge for long distance calls.  But given tariff ceilings on local 
calls of INR 0.80, INR 1.00 or INR 1.20 per local MCU of 2 minutes duration, the portion 
of access deficit not covered by the local calls had to be recovered from long distance 
calls.  Therefore distance categories were set as the following: up to 50 Km; 50 to 200 Km; 
200 to 500 Km; beyond 500 Km and international long distance calls.  Accordingly TRAI 
ruled that for all BSOs, fixed line calls, either at one or both ends of the call, attracted 
ADC. TRAI also ruled that cellular mobile and WLL-M did not have any access deficit on 
account of rentals and free calls, nor below cost call charges in the market determined 
tariff regime under which it operated.   
 
The ADC calculation was already quite complex.  In addition TRAI noted that given the 
incomplete status of implementation of the inter-carrier charge billing systems of the 
incumbent it may be difficult to implement inter-carrier settlements within a multi-
operator environment until the technical problems were sorted out.  Therefore, in the 
interim period, until differential ADC could be implemented, TRAI provided two 
alternative models to recover the same amount of IUC; one of which gave uniform ADC 
for inter-circle calls above 50 Km and the other a differential ADC based on distance.   
 
The result was a set of ADC amounts based on type of originating technology, type of 
terminating technology, whether the calls were inter or intra-circle and the distance 
band.  The final ADC amount within India ranged from either none or INR 0.50, INR 
1.25 and INR 2.00 per minute.  ADC for incoming and outgoing international long 
distance calls were set at INR 5.00 per minute.   
 
Based on the above calculation the total amount of funds to be actually collected and 
paid to fixed line BSOs through the ADC regime was estimated to be INR 130,000 million 
per year amounting to 30% of the total revenue of the telecom sector.  The following 
chart 2.1 compares this figure with several other countries: 
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These figures immediately raise a question as to whether the size of the Indian ADC was 
justifiable from a sustainability perspective.  In fact, the lower ADC in other countries at 
the time was partly due to tariff re-balancing having been achieved to a substantial 
degree before liberalization.  Also revenues on local access and rentals were higher on 
average in the other countries.   
 
However, in justifying the large ADC, TRAI made the following statement: “Since higher 
tariffs and ARPUs are not sustainable for India, especially in view of our objective to 
have a rapid growth in tele-density, it is important to cover the access deficit for some 
years till a reasonable stable consumer base is developed, which can be sustainable, 
despite low rentals and tariffs.”  Many saw this as an attempt to sustain the business of 




TRAI had initially envisaged the implementation of the ADC regime by 1 April 2003.  
However, with several service providers submitting alternative plans in the interim, the 
implementation finally got underway on 1 May 2003.  But just as the implementation 
commenced, it became obvious that the TRAI had created an unequal playing field by 
bringing in complex and confusing arguments to determine multiple ADC amounts by 
insisting that technology and distance mattered in the decision.  It further complicated 
the calculation by using unsubstantiated historical costs (only from incumbent) in 
calculating the ADC.   
 
At a more macro level, the logic of ADC seemed to have created a fixed wire-line bubble that 
would burst unless continuously supported by ADC (or some other format of a subsidy).  This 
was because through ADC, all operators were levied a fee to prop up the fixed line 
incumbent who could not compete in the market without the same.   
 
In any case, TRAI pushed ahead with implementing the ADC regime.  But soon the fixed 
line tariffs submitted for approval by the incumbent BSNL showed that these tariffs were 
below the levels required to cover the IUC plus ADC amounts, i.e. they were in effect 
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TRAI was “forced” (in their own words) to accept these tariffs of the incumbent mainly 
on the grounds that below cost prices being charged by the incumbent were not to kill 
competition, but to survive in business and hence were not predatory in nature.  
Consequently other BSOs also had to reduce tariffs to below cost levels, thus 
necessitating a re-look at the entire regime.  Such lowering of tariffs obviously impacted 
upon the recoveries of ADCs amounts envisaged.   
 
Table 2.2 below provides a comparison of the IUC plus ADC charges set by TRAI and 
the actual applied tariffs in the intra-circle case.   
 
Table 2.2: Actual vs. Applied Tariffs for Intra-Circle Calls 
 
F: Fixed or WLL-F; W: WLL-M; C: Cellular 
Source: TRAI; IUC Regulation 29 October 2003 
 
2.3 Implementation Problems and Solutions 
 
In this background and with the difficulty in applying the ADC regime starting to be felt 
by the various operators, the industry (and consumer groups) raised several issues.  In 
order to resolve these concerns TRAI put out a Consultation Paper in May 2003.  Several 
key concerns the consultation attempted to resolve and how they were addressed are 
highlighted below: 
 
 ADC calculations should be forward looking not historical 
Industry suggested that instead of historical figures that were used to calculate ADC, 
TRAI should conduct its analysis based on Forward Looking Long Run Incremental 
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TRAI having considered the evidence ruled that while it was imperative that the 
calculation be based on FLLRIC over a period of time, it would not be wise to shift 
from historical costs in one time period.  The argument that, BSNL had provided the 
bulk of all rural services and that it had over time supported low paying subscribers 
and also that such a shift would adversely impact BSNL not only in rural services but 
nation-wide played a more important role than a pure efficiency argument.  TRAI 
was of the view that with BSNL deploying new technology and lower cost 
equipment in its expansion programme, some part of the existing high cost network 
will be gradually replaced by such equipment reducing the need for high ADC.  
Given this background TRAI decided to continue with historical pricing, but be 
current as much as possible and also obtain costs for other BSO as well.  
  
It is evident that this policy decision was biased towards protecting the interests of 
the incumbent than being one that would have promoted competition using 
emerging technology.     
 
 ADC calculations should be adjusted for various concessions granted by the 
Government to BSNL  
 
Having considered the reimbursement of license fees and other concessions to BSNL 
from the Government, TRAI made several changes to its calculation of the ADC 
based on the BSNL figures to make the same more reflective of reality.  Assistance 
provided to BSNL by the Government was incorporated in calculating the access 
deficit for BSNL.   
 
These revisions impacted significantly on the total ADC.  This figure was thus 
revised downward from the original INR 130,000 million to INR 63,300 million (INR 
53,350 only for BSNL).  These revisions caused the estimated access deficit to be 
revised downwards to around 10-12% of the sector revenue from the original 30%.   
   
 MTNL and private BSOs should not be given ADC in light of their presence in urban 
areas and the roll-out obligations remaining mostly unmet 
  
TRAI considered using independent normative techniques to measure the access 
deficit of a number of BSOs including MTNL and concluded that they continue to 
have some access deficit, but they were much smaller than the amounts calculated 
for them on the basis of their own cost data.  At the same time TRAI also noted the 
fact that a number of cases the BSO had not met their roll-out obligations, 
particularly for village public telephones (VPTs) that the old BSOs had to install.  In 
contrast to non-BSNL operators, TRAI observed that most of the rural DELs were 
provided by BSNL, which also provided connections to a relatively large number of 
low users as seen is Table 2.3.  It also pointed out that in general, in other countries, 
ADC is paid only to the incumbent and not to new comers. 
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Source: TRAI IUC regulations 29 October 2003 
 
In conclusion TRAI was of the view that it would be better to limit the disruption to 
the existing regime, instead of bringing about changes in the ADC regime which 
could create further implementation problems.   
 
Thus, it decided to implement a limited form of the IUC regime for non-BSNL BSOs, 
i.e. they would keep the relevant ADC amounts only for calls originating from them.  
The ADC that was to be collected at termination by non-BSNL fixed line BSOs was 
hence removed.  
 
 ADC base is too small: increase the capture of ADC to all calls from everyone 
 
Given the large amount of ADC to be recovered from long distance minutes 
involving fixed lines, the ADC per minute on fixed wire-line calls had to be large 
since the number of such minutes available was a small share of the total minutes 
used (estimated at 22%).   
 
In this background, the ability of cellular and WLL-M service providers to charge 
lower tariffs for long distance calls were reducing the demand from fixed lines, 
which in turn would have meant a further increase in ADC per minute if it was 
collected only from fixed line long distance minutes.  Therefore, the purpose of 
prescribing ADC for compensating BSOs to provide affordable service was in fact 
being defeated. 
 
Therefore, TRAI decided to apply ADC to all access providers barring intra-circle 
WLL-M and cellular calls, thus making the base larger than only the applicability 
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This ruling meant that immaterial of whether one used BSNL services at all to 
originate, carry or terminate a call within (or outside) India, an ADC had to be paid 
to the incumbent on every call made except for WLL-M and cellular intra-circle calls.  
 
 ADC funding should not continue for the foreseeable future, i.e. a cut-off date should 
be specified 
 
The industry felt that with the changes in technology and a reduction in equipment 
costs taking place rapidly, the amount of funding required for ADC should decline.  
 
TRAI was in agreement and observed that over time, within a few years, therefore, it 
may be possible to do away with the ADC regime, and that it could be merged with 
the USO regime.  TRAI pointed out that this would be similar to the situation in most 
other countries, where the ADC regime had been combined with the USO regime, 
rather than the ADC funding being provided through a separate ADC regime. 
 
The implicit argument was that ADC was a kind of “infant industry” subsidy being 
paid to the incumbent through a tax on its competition which would be removed 
when it was “ready” to compete in the open market.  The issue however, was that 
given the incumbent had already enjoyed 50 years of monopoly, had it not recouped 
its historical costs?  
 
 Uniform and differential ADC too complicated to implement 
 
In addition to whether a call involved a fixed line or a cellular or WLL-M line, ADC 
calculation also depended on distance under one alternative, and did not depend on 
distance under the other alternative.  With this choice being given to individual 
operators, a chaotic situation arose when multiple operators in circles start adopting 
different practices.  The industry argued that this difference is being misused by the 
NLD operators to terminate cellular to fixed inter-circle long distance calls through 
the POIs with other cellular networks in the terminating circle depriving the BSO of 
genuine termination charges.   
 
The alternative methods of calculating ADC was scrapped in favour of the escalating 
by distance methodology in the October 2003 revision.   
 
 Review possible reduction in the amount of ADC for ILD calls to address grey traffic 
 
The industry raised the point that given INR 5.00 ADC for incoming international 
traffic being too high, there were greater incentives to promote a grey market for ILD 
calls through subversions. 
 
In the October 2003 revision, TRAI revised downwards the ADC on ILD to INR 4.25 
per minute, with a view further lowering this amount over time. 
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BSNL argued that the ADC of private BSO was only INR 174 per month whereas, the 
ADC of BSNL was of the order of about INR 269 per month per DEL and it was 
unfair to provide non-BSNL basic fixed line operators the higher BSNL figure.   
 
Based on all of the above and other detailed consultations, TRAI revised the original 
IUC (and ADC) regime in October 2003 as depicted in Table 2.4.   
 
Table 2.4: Revised ADC 
 
Source: TRAI IUC Regulation, 29 October 2003 
 
Having made these substantial revisions to the ADC, TRAI assured that it would, soon 
review both the size of the ADC payments as well as who should benefit from the ADC 
regime.  
 
TRAI suggested that it may consider funding ADC based on a percentage of the annual 
revenues of operators and that the ADC may be merged with the USO regime over time, 
say in about 3 to 5 years.  
 
By making the many revisions to ADC, TRAI agreed that their earlier formulation was 
detrimental to the very service provider they were attempting to protect (BSNL) when it 
said “In the earlier regime 92% of the ADC revenues were being contributed by BSOs 
(primarily BSNL) and the ADC as a percentage of their revenues were about 40%. 
Instead of helping BSOs, particularly BSNL, the earlier regime could have driven them 
out of business.”5 
 
These revisions, originally expected to have been implemented by 1 December 2003, 
were delayed to 15 December 2003 and then finally implemented on 1 February 2004. 
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2.4 Growth Momentum Continues 
 
While the debate on ADC was going on, the subscriber base as a whole saw steady 
growth.  However, as seen in Chart 2.5 below, while the urban tele-density reached 14 by 
end 2003 (and 20 towards the end of 2004) the trend of growth in the rural areas saw 
hardly any growth; moving from 1.2 at end 2002 to 1.5 at end 2003 (and 1.55 end 2004).    
 
Chart 2.5: India Tele-density  
 
Source: TRAI Study Paper on Indicators for Telecom Growth, June 2005 
 
On the other hand, Charts 2.6 and 2.7 below indicate the actual and forecast dramatic 
growth in mobile subscriber base while indicating a very moderate rate of growth for the 
fixed subscriber base.  These trends do not offer support for the logic extended for ADC 
in terms of improving teledensity through expanding BSNL fixed line service.    
 
Chart 2.6: Mobile Subscriber Base 
 
 
Source: TRAI Study Paper on Indicators for Telecom Growth, June 2005 
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Source: TRAI Study Paper on Indicators for Telecom Growth, June 2005 
 
2.5 Further Problems and Solutions 
 
The 1 February 2004 implementation of the revised ADC regime ran in to trouble right 
from the beginning.  TRAI observed that, by June 2004 only a “very few” settlements had 
taken place.  It appeared that most operators had not raised relevant invoices and their 
call patterns seemed suspicious; some showing no ILD calls.  In fact the distance based 
calculation had become difficult to implement within the numerous conditions of being 
intra, or inter circle, and distance differences and technology used etc.  On top of all this, 
the data reconciliation problem had got even more complicated due to BSNL not being 
able to complete their billing system implementation as expected. 
  
TRAI having recognized the complexity of their methodology after two attempts and 
detailed consultations to perfect the calculation stated that “experience suggests that it 
would be useful to evolve a simpler method of collecting ADC which does not involve 
distance based and call based ADC, and may also be subject to easier verification.” 
 
Having created an ADC regime that was rather complex to say the least, TRAI put out 
another consultation paper in June 2004 which suggested that a simpler revenue share 
mechanism might be the answer.  TRAI proposed the new regime would be from 
October 2004 to September 2005 with a revenue share proposed between 2.2 percent and 
5.3 percent. 
 
Even though TRAI had expected to simplify the methodology and implement a revenue 
share regime, the industry was not willing to go along with such a scheme.  A number of 
stakeholders, primarily BSNL, opposed it on the grounds that it would increase rentals 
and local call charges.  The argument was that unlike in the USO where the revenue 
share amount was collected from the existing overall license fee imposing no additional 
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an additional imposition over and above the existing license fee revenue share.  This 
additional burden or the increase in rental and local call charges was shown to take place 
because the revenue share would not compensate for the existing asymmetrically high 
ADC contribution levied on ILD and NLD traffic. 
 
In this background TRAI once again revised the ADC with the following salient features: 
 
 Continue with a per minute ADC, but at a much reduced rate:  With the number of 
minutes available for funding ADC increasing dramatically due to more than 
anticipated subscriber growth as seen in Charts 2.6 and 2.7 in earlier page TRAI felt it 
would be possible to collect the required ADC amount with a lower charge per 
minute.  Note however that this increase in minutes was originating primarily from 
cellular phones.  
 
 Maintain the total ADC amount at the level that was provided in the regime notified 
in October 2003 for both BSNL and for the other fixed line operators. 
 
 “Death of distance”: The ADC regime simplified for domestic long distance calls by 
applying one figure to all calls. 
 
In this background TRAI had to grapple with the ADC amount that should be levied 
across the board vs. the ADC on ILD given the competing objectives of reducing 
domestic call charges; addressing grey market ILD calls and ensuring that the benefits 
do not pass along to foreign carriers and consumers at the cost of domestic consumers 
and operators.  The assessment was based on the premise that for funding a given ADC 
amount, any reduction in the per minute ADC charge on ILD calls would require an 
increase in the ADC charge on domestic calls.  Likewise, any increase in per minute ADC 
charge on ILD calls would result in a lower ADC charge on domestic calls.  In this 
situation of a trade-off among these objectives, TRAI selected what it called an 
“appropriate balance” while specifying the new ADC with higher priority given to the 
objective of reducing domestic tariffs to meet domestic consumer interest, and spurring 
sustained growth with supplementary measures (monitoring and penalty) that will 
address the grey market problem.   
 
These changes resulted in a uniform ADC of INR 0.30 per minute for all calls across the 
nation (with the continued exception of intra-circle WLL-M/cellular to WLL-M/cellular); 
INR 3.25 per minute for incoming ILD calls and INR 2.50 on outgoing ILD calls as 
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What the new ADC regime meant was that all operators would need to collect the now 
lower INR 0.30 ADC (with the intra-circle WLL-M/cellular to WLL-M/cellular exception) 
and pass it on to BSNL.  Non-BSNL fixed BSOs were allowed to retain originating ADC 
as before. 
 
With this yet again revised ADC slated to go in to effect on 1 February 2005, TRAI 
reserved the right to evaluate the progress in 3 to 6 months and make any relevant 
changes without any further consultation.  However, TRAI noted that another 
consultation paper would be brought out on admissibility and quantum of ADC for 
fixed line operators based on an examination of the relevant network elements data, 
including the verification of the cost items that were presented in the annual reports of 
service providers, the implementation of the USO regime, continued admissibility of 
WLL-F for ADC, and other factors affecting the ADC estimates.  It noted that this review 
may also cover a review of the IUC regime.  
 
With this reduction on ADC, primarily on ISD calls by 41% and on STD calls by 61%, 
mobile subscriber bills on ISD charges fell by average between 11% and 24% while STD 
call rates fell by between 16% and 27%.  Immediately after announcement however, 
BSNL claimed that they would take a financial hit of about INR 12,500 million annually 
(Calculated as INR 3,000 million from outgoing ISD traffic, INR 1,700 million from on 
incoming calls and INR 7,800 million from the reduction of ADC on STD calls).  BSNL 
was of the view that long-distance traffic would not increase in the same ratio as the 
number of subscribers.  With the exclusion of fixed line operators other than BSNL from 
retaining ADC on incoming calls, MTNL also projected a loss of INR 4,500 million. 
 
But from TRAI’s point of view their objective of protecting the incumbent in the 
transition was now effectively being met with a lower ADC given the massive increase 
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2.6 Final Consultation 
 
Based on the above communication of January 2005, TRAI put out the said consultation 
paper on 17 March 2005 with a number of points relevant to the ADC regime.  They inter 
alia dealt with the justification of ADC on rural and urban fixed wireless lines and 
admissibility of ADC for non-BSNL fixed line operators and agreeing on revenue share 
methodology for ADC prior to being unified with the USO fund.  
 
 Why should ADC not be applicable for rural wire-lines only 
 
One of the key issues brought out was whether ADC should be applicable only to 
rural fixed wire-lines.  From the beginning of the ADC regime, TRAI did not 
consider ADC as a “rural subsidy” and the deficit was calculated as an average of all 
fixed lines in both urban and rural areas.   
 
Table 2.9 below illustrates the situation (as at end September 2004) with regard to the 
role played by BSNL in the provision of rural fixed lines in rural India. 
 




While admitting the justification of higher ADC for rural lines TRAI however noted 
in the context of ADC the rural vs. urban comparison per se was less meaningful 
than the implications of the network’s distribution of urban/rural lines in terms of 
costs and revenues.  Also, the complexity in obtaining and authenticating data for 
calculating cost based rural ADC, particularly with respect to non-BSNL operators 
was a major practical problem given that investments were lumpy and was not 
necessarily demarcated by urban and rural.   
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In terms of reassessing if ADC should be paid for non-BSNL operators, TRAI was of 
the firm view that access deficit compensation “did not arise out of any legal right 
but out of consideration of smoothening the transition process during competition, 
i.e. providing support during the transition period when costs of access are not fully 
recovered from the revenues from access line monthly rentals under existing tariff 
regime due to competition in the market and other factors”.  TRAI calculations over 
time had indicated that by considering the total areas of operation, the access deficit 
for non-BSNL fixed line operators were in fact much lower, if at all.  In addition, in 
all its ADC calculations, TRAI had been attempting to keep call costs at a minimum 
possible to boost growth. 
 
 Why should WLL-F be treated similarly to fixed wire-line 
 
For ADC purposes, calls to and from WLL-F had always been treated similar to calls 
to and from fixed lines.  In fact, fixed wireless lines had become the primary method 
of expansion of the non-BSNL fixed line operators as seen in Table 2.9 above.  But, 
the question had arisen if it was a fair practice to adopt as WLL-F could be 
considered tantamount to full cellular services which could be offered seamlessly 
throughout the service area. 
 
TRAI while agreeing that access deficit of WLL-F was negligible and also agreeing 
that certain amount of misuse in terms of physical movement of WLL-F phones were 
taking place was of the view that given the current inability to distinguish calls 
originating between fixed lines and WLL-F that the regime should be maintained 
until it was technically possible to separate them out.  In the meantime TRAI had 
requested that WLL-F phones be locked (to a particular RF section of the base 
station) to limit physical movement of the phone.   
 
 Should revenue share be introduced to calculate ADC 
 
Another point of recurring contention was the moving to an ADC regime based on 
revenue share.  Here a crucial factor was the large transition that would be required 
if the ADC amount charged per minute for ILD calls were converted into a revenue 
share. TRAI was of the opinion that the transition would become easier if the 
corresponding ADC per minute amount was lower and could be distributed more 
easily on a larger base of minutes and revenues that will generate ADC funds.  Over 
time, this would become possible as the increases in the subscriber base would result 
in much larger number of minutes that generate the ADC funds, and as the ADC 
amounts themselves decrease. They argued that would help avoid a “large 


































 Diversifying Network Participation: Study of   India’s Universal Service Instruments 
DRAFT: September 1, 2005 
 
 32
2.7 Remaining Issues with ADC 
 
The ADC, even after the many revisions, continues to be conceptually complicated, 
discriminatory, technologically biased and with insufficient calculation transparency.  
The following section deals with some of the key issues that need addressing. 
 
 ADC has a specific objective and that does not include any “rural obligations” 
 
The Government and TRAI had stated that ADC is required for providing basic 
telecom services affordable to the common man to promote both universal service 
and universal access.  Some in the industry however have interpreted this at different 
times to be a “subsidy” required to provide access to rural and remote areas of the 
country where phone services do not cover the cost of providing such services 
because rentals which are fixed by the regulator were below costs.  
 
In this context it must be pointed out that after November 5, 2003, urban tariffs were 
foreborne and not mandated by the regulator.  Thus, ipso facto, ADC was justifiably 
perceived as a compensation for below cost tariffs in the rural areas. Moreover, given 
that urban tariffs for basic services had also been left to the market forces, TRAI 
should not have let urban fixed lines attract ADC.  But ADC had a far broader 
reasoning; to give the incumbent sufficient time to recoup its stranded costs based on 
historical costs, such that the new technologies do not cannibalize copper which the 
incumbent had adopted.  This would have also meant a substitution of technologies 
(concept known as disruptive technologies) by the consumers and in the background 
of an improper spectrum pricing a clamor for the scarce resource. 
 
The objective of ADC must be made very clear; that it does not have any rural 
obligation; but has a rural bias because access deficit is higher in the rural areas due 
to affordability (and mandated below cost tariff) issues.  Also it must be made clear 
that ADC is based on overall access deficit and not on deficit in either rural only or 
low-user urban only areas. 
  
 BSNL is provided ADC for high historical costs, so non-BSNL fixed line operators 
(and any others) do not qualify for ADC 
 
If access deficit is defined for fixed lines, some feel that there is a strong case for 
providing ADC support regardless of the fact whether the service provider is BSNL, 
or any other.  However TRAI’s logic is that ADC is for a smooth transition for BSNL 
during the period in to competition. 
 
The counter argument to this position is that BSNL was created out of DOT some five 
years ago after decades of monopoly profits and that any transition to a competitive 
market should now have been complete.  It is further argued by industry that prior 
to the induction of private operators in basic services in 1995-96, DOT provided 
services in rural areas as part of its social objectives and that for these efforts, private 
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TRAI contends however that BSNL does not have any accounts during the period 
when it was a unit of DOT and that it is assumed that it did not earn monopoly rents 
that would have covered its large and costly rural rollout obligations. However this 
argument is suspect, since the outcomes on not only universal service but roll-outs 
were poor indicated by long waiting lists. Also, there is agreement among many that 
the incumbent carries a large amount of excess baggage in terms of organizational 
inefficiencies which are being subsidized by ADC. 
 
 The existing ADC regime reduces incentives for lower cost technology solutions in 
the rural areas. 
 
The continuation of ADC in the current format also needs to be considered in terms 
of the technology bias it builds in.  It is a fact that BSNL has, for a long time provided 
rural services using wire-line technology.  However it is also a fact that the cost of 
providing the same service using wireless technology is much more economical, and 
such is being observed across the board by non-BSNL operators. Even though BSNL 
was free to deploy new wireless technology since private operators were enabled to 
adopt WLL as an access technology in 1998, BSNL did not do so in a significant 
manner as shown in Table 2.9.   
 
But, ironically, the ADC is calculated based on the (historical) cost of providing the 
more expensive fixed wire-line services by BSNL.  In this background, the issues is 
whether TRAI should penalize operators for deploying latest technologies vis-à-vis 
BSNL’s choice of technology.  This mechanism in fact amounts to a situation where 
private operators are compensating BSNL for the “wrong” choice of technology.  
Some stakeholders even stretch to argue that BSNL should refund the ADC for all 
DELs added by BSNL after October 2000.  The more important point however is that, 
were BSNL to increase its deployment of wireless technology, the costs that need to 
be supported by the ADC would diminish ensuring a lower, more affordable service. 
 
In addition, it stifles the introduction of lower cost technology (particularly niche 
technology in rural and remote areas) by non-BSNL operators in rural areas where 
market driven lower tariffs may not provide sufficient revenue to make such 
solutions viable on top of ADC to be recovered and paid to BSNL for their high cost 
solutions in the same areas. 
 
 Is argument for ADC for basic stand alone services valid anymore?  
 
Many in the industry argue that parameters that have been accepted internationally 
as the key pre-requisites to be fulfilled before ADC can become applicable have not 
been met in India.  Normally ADC is attracted when the service is stand-alone; the 
tariff is fixed by the regulator; and revenues from the service is below costs.   
 
Industry therefore argues that in the Indian context, these criteria can apply only for 
fixed line services provided in rural areas and not for all fixed line phones across the 
country.  Also whether the services provided by BSNL are stand-alone products or a 
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questionable.  In fact it is alleged that BSNL is using some of the same infrastructure 
for its mobile services in remote and rural areas thereby spreading the capital 
expenditure and revenue recovery over a wider range of services.  The valid point is 
that this provides BSNL a cost advantage to compete with other private operators.  
 
But at a broader level, the question is, why only basic services?  The reason for this 
decision was that at the time the ADC was originally designed in January 2003, basic 
telecom service providers who had historically run cross-subsidies by which 
relatively high long-distance tariffs brought in surpluses which were used to offset 
the losses that would otherwise have resulted in rural low revenue areas were unable 
to do so with competition eroding the margins available in the long-distance 
segment.  The ADC was designed to provide these basic service operators the ability 
to cover the gap between tariff and costs.  The emphasis on basic service operators 
was due to the fact that the number of fixed line subscribers far exceeded the mobile 
subscribers and the likely trends at that time continued to show a major dominance 
of the incumbent basic service operators (BSNL and MTNL) for the next few years.  
However, the circumstances have now changed.  The growth of fixed and mobile 
subscribers during 2004-2005 in comparison to earlier years is shown below in Table 
2.10. 
 
Table 2.10: Growth in Fixed and Mobile Subscriptions 
 
Service  March 03 March 04  March 05  
% growth 
during year 
1.Fixed including WLL-F  41.48  42.58  45.9  8  
Mobile including WLL-M 
(CDMA + GSM)  
13.00  33.58  52.17  55  
Gross Total, millions  54.48  76.16  98.08  29  
Source: TRAI Press Release, Growth in Telecom Services 2004-05 
 
The number of mobile subscribers now exceeds the number of fixed line subscribers. 
Thus, the circumstantial reason for placing an emphasis on basic telecom services does 
not necessarily stand any more.  
 
In this backdrop, perhaps TRAI should focus on achieving the objectives of universal 
service and universal access by providing equal emphasis to all telecom services, rather 
than being biased with just basic telecom services.  However, this implies a reversal of 
ADC objectives of TRAI from protecting BSNL to one of network development in rural 
areas.   
 
 Does the ADC regime encourage parallel markets?   
 
The industry feels that the ADC on ILD calls should continue on a per minute basis 
till the overall requirement of ADC reduces significantly.  The existing ADC on ILD 
calls is far higher than the ADC on domestic long distance calls and contributes 
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percentage of adjusted gross revenue for ILD calls would reduce this contribution 
significantly and shift the burden of a large portion of the ADC from foreign 
operators to domestic customers.  
 
From a bypass point of view, the main problem with the ADC scheme is that it 
rewards those who can avoid or evade the pricing and payment rules that are 
defined in the ADC scheme.  The industry is forthright in pointing out that 
characterized by the rapid technological development and convergence, some types 
of by-pass of ADC regulations cannot be prevented.  ADCs will encourage the use of 
technologies that do not have to pay ADCs or pay ADCs only on one part of the 
service, such as can occur when a mix of packet and switched technologies are used 
in the service such as Voice over IP networks. The use of VSAT, private networks, 
call-back and possibly off-peak transmission over cellular and fiber infrastructure 
owned or leased by mobile operators, are other examples of ways the rules can be 
and are avoided.  
 
 ADC needs greater calculation transparency 
 
BSNL continues to argue that many wrongs have been committed in calculation of 
ADC funding of BSNL and that they should be duly compensated for these mistakes.  
They point out that this amount is some INR 64,650 million, which adds to total 
arrears due to BSNL of approximately INR 110,000 million on account of poor 
collection efficiency. 
 
Related to this point is the issue of transparency in calculating the ADC.  There have 
been complains that TRAI has been less than open to sharing data and information.  
The responses to the consultation paper points out that under its Act, TRAI is 
required to ensure transparency while exercising its powers and discharging its 
functions.  They continue to point out that having issued the Access to Information 
Regulation in March 2005, which upholds the rights of all stakeholders to have access 
to the information obtained or received by the TRAI the authority has not been 
forthcoming with certain information, referring to the VSNL vs. TRAI Appeal No. 5 
of 2005 decision of 28.4.2005. 
 
Private operators further argue that with BSNL being the beneficiary of the subsidy, 
it should stand up to transparent scrutiny and justify the quantum being availed or 
claimed, more so when it happens to be the largest telecom service provider in the 
country and also being a fully state owned enterprise. 
 
 Difficult to implement 
 
Implementation of the ADC regime continues to be difficult.  Having started in 2001 
December and having issued the first order in 2003 May, the implementation was 
revised and reimplementation in 2004 February (delayed from 2003 December); and 
again in 2005 February.  But, as of mid 2005, the implementation problems continue 
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Having started out with a very complex calculation, the multiple revisions have 
simplified the ADC to almost child’s play after paying a heavy price for the 
confusion, uncertainty and the various allegations of lack of transparency and bias it 
attracted.   
 
2.8 Possible way forward with ADC 
  
The analyses made in the sections above indicate that while the objective of ADC is valid 
at the macro level of providing affordable telecom services to the common man, its design and 
implementation could have been improved based on the many issues that had been 
raised at the more micro level.   
 
While agreeing with the argument that BSNL has been and continues to be the main 
provider of telecom services to the vast rural masses of India, the current ADC regime 
however provides an undue competitive advantage to BSNL and creates a situation 
where inefficient technology is being subsidized at the expensive of cheaper and more 
efficient technology of its competitors.   
 
To meet the objectives of the Government of India and TRAI, the simplest approach 
perhaps would be to merge the ADC with the existing USO on a simple, technology 
neutral, revenue share model.  Disbursements from the combined fund could be made to 
compensate mandated “below cost” services being provided by any operator, perhaps 
anywhere (depending on where tariff ceilings are effected).  Over time, the size of the 
ADC fund could be reduced because for one, the USO fund would continue to grow on 
account of increasing sector revenues and two, the introduction of new technologies and 


































 Diversifying Network Participation: Study of   India’s Universal Service Instruments 




The WTO reference paper on telecommunications states the following in the context of 
universal service obligations being undertaken by any member: 
 
Any member of the WTO has the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes 
to maintain. Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided they are 
administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and are not 
more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service defined by the member. 
 
In this paper our attempt has been to analyze the Indian universal service instruments 
both, USO as well as ADC in this context.  The questions we addressed were:  How well 
do the Indian universal service instruments stand the test of (a) not being anti-
competitive; (b) transparent in their administration; and (c) non-discriminatory and 
competitively neutral.  Unfortunately, the universal service policy has been biased in 
favour of the incumbent.  Though the approach that has been followed in selection of the 
universal service provider in India is a transparent multi-layered reverse bidding 
process (in which the least quoted subsidy below the reserve price became the 
representative rate at which subsidy was disbursed to the successful Universal Service 
provider) and the competitive bid process has led to a significant lowering of the 
benchmark subsidy rates, bringing it down to 65 to 70% in the case of rural direct 
exchange lines (RDELs), there have been concerns that in the absence of network 
competition the incumbent has leveraged its vertically integrated status even in a 
transparent disbursement mechanism. The competitive non-neutrality of these 
instruments is therefore a major concern.  
 
The incumbent had an edge over its competitors as it had a large amount of the static 
infrastructure or backbone, and it has been able to foreclose entry by making entry for 
the new entrants into rural markets unviable even with subsidy.  It is not surprising 
therefore that almost 75 percent of the subsidy auctions were won by the incumbent.  As 
noted in this paper rural connectivity could have been seen as on opportunity and not as 
an obligation, had this structurally imbalanced situation in which the incumbent had a 
huge volume of the essential facility on which the new entrants relied had been shared 
for extending access.  If that had been allowed then the viability concerns for the new 
entrants would have been limited to the costs of technology that go into the backbone i.e. 
the access network costs.  In the current design, the new entrant has to factor in the costs 
of laying the backbone while deciding its entry into the rural markets.  As discussed in 
the paper, this was not done despite the presence of excess capacity in the backbone 
infrastructure.  India has vast infrastructure resources lying in the ground or under 
water – but the fibre has not been lit.  Thus, our research suggests that in future the 
universal service policy should be devised by factoring this in.  The advantages will be 
twofold: (a) costs of universal service will be low and hence coverage greater for the 
same costs; (b) universal service will be competitively more neutral and avoid the pitfalls 
of market abuse by the incumbent.  In such a scenario the universal service costs will be 
largely due dynamic costs of the backbone technology, i.e. the cost of access technology. 
Moreover, if the access technology is not predefined various technological options to 
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telephone network (PSTN) infrastructure in India when voice over internet protocol 
l(VoIP) is cheaper by at least 70 percent.  Given the multifunctionality of this technology 
the costs can be spread over its diverse uses, voice and data.  To this end it is therefore 
important that universal service is accompanied by regulations which impose special 
obligations on the dominant operator and enforces its compliance, which in turn will 
counterbalance its market power.  Second, certain other steps like lowering the tax 
burden on the operators can reduce the endogenous costs of telecom business and make 
rural entry a viable business opportunity.  This measure will also encourage other small 
private sector operators with not so deep pockets provide innovative and cheap 
solutions for access as long as they have access to the state-owned incumbents already 
developed trunk fiber.  If the state is serious of diversifying network participation then it 
should see that narrow ministerial considerations do not impede such regulations.  Once 
these regulatory design is in place the private sector and competition, will take care that 
affordable services are available to all. 
 
Having arrived at the above not so positive conclusions on the universal service fund 
mechanism our research in to the Access Deficit Charge also leads us to conclude that 
notwithstanding the explanations TRAI has provided to the numerous questions raised 
by the industry over India’s ADC, that the ADC is a quasi-politically motivated tax on 
private operators to protect the incumbent BSNL during what seems like a very long 
transition period to competition.  
 
While the ADC has been able to sustain BSNL’s high cost operation, not purely due to its 
high historical cost access network that TRAI refers to, but also its bloated staff and 
inefficient processes akin to incumbent operators pretty much cross the world, the 
reason why it has not seriously impacted private operators negatively has nothing to do 
with TRAI’s safeguards for them.  It has been the massive growth in the mobile sector 
that has created an equally massive volume of minutes to pass on a reduced ADC to a 
greater number of customers. 
 
It seems that TRAI is adamant to protect BSNL during the transition when its action 
indicates that ADC is nothing more than an attempt to save the copper wire network so 
that at a later date if it becomes necessary the nation would be able to take advantage of 
the same.  However, TRAI could well consider other more market friendly and more 
efficient ways of protecting the copper network instead on taxing efficient operators to 
keep an inefficient operator who owns the copper network afloat.  As pointed out earlier 
the ADC seems to have created a fixed wire-line bubble that would burst unless 
continuously supported by ADC or some other format of a subsidy.  But such subsidies 
cannot be sustained for any significant period of time without distorting the entire 
market.  What happens when the ADC is phased out in total?  If BSNL has then grown 
up to face a competitive market well and good; if not does it mean that all the taxes 
extracted from private operators to keep BSNL afloat would have been a complete 
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Guidelines for Implementation of Universal Service Support 
 
1. The New Telecom Policy’99 envisaged provision of access to basic telecom services to 
all at affordable and reasonable prices. The resources for meeting the Universal 
Service Obligation (USO) shall be generated through a Universal Service Levy (USL), 
at a prescribed percentage of the revenue earned by the operators holding different 
type of licenses. Further, NTP’99 envisaged implementation of Universal Service 
Obligation for rural and remote areas through all Basic service providers who will be 
reimbursed from the funds collected by way of USL. Other service providers shall 
also be allowed to participate in USO provisioning subject to technical feasibility and 
shall be similarly reimbursed out of the funds of USL.  
 
2.  It has been decided to extend support to the Universal Service from the Financial 
Year 2002-03 and the following are broad guidelines for implementation of Universal 
Service Support Policy:  
i)  The funds created by the Universal Service Levy shall be spent in rural and remote 
areas on both the public access telephones or Community telephones meant for 
public use and individual household telephones in net high-cost rural/ remote areas.  
ii)  The support from Universal Service Fund will be provided to meet Net Cost (i.e. Cost 
minus Revenue) of providing the universal service.  
iii)  In the event of an increase in the requirement of Universal service Obligation (USO), 
the percentage of contribution towards USL can be raised to meet such additional 
requirement but the added levy will be drawn out of the prevalent percentage of 
license fee keeping the ceiling intact and as such, will not cause any additional 
burden either on the service providers or the consumers.  
iv)  The implementation of USO will be divided into two clearly identifiable streams:  
 
 A) Stream-I   B) Stream-II 
 
 A) Stream-I: Provision of Public Telecom and Information services 
 
 a)  Installation of VPTs in the remaining villages. For installation of VPTs in 
the 6,07,491 villages, identified as per 1991 census which were required to be 
covered by 31.3.2002, no reimbursement towards Capital recovery shall be 
admissible and given. However, the Net Cost towards operating expenses of 
these VPTs will be reimbursed. For the remaining villages, i.e. additional 
revenue villages identified as per 2001 Census, the Net cost towards both, the 
annual capital recovery as well as annual operating expenses will be allowed 
as a support from the USF.  
 b)  Provision of additional rural community phones in areas after achieving 
the target of one VPT in every village. The second public phone will also be 
installed in villages where population exceeds 2000. These may be provided 
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purpose of support from the USF, the Net cost towards both annual capital 
recovery as well as annual operating expenses will be allowed.  
 c)  Replacement of VPTs installed before 1.4.2002. A large number of VPTs 
working on MARR Systems will in the first instance be required to be 
replaced to ensure their reliable operation. The BSOs will be required to draw 
up a yearly plan for replacement of such VPTs and support from USF will be 
allowed towards both the annual capital recovery as well as annual operating 
expenses.  
 d)  Upgradation of VPTs to Public Telecom and Info Centers (PTICs). It shall 
be endeavoured to provide, by the year 2004, for data transmission facilities 
within 5 Kms of every village and at least in all those villages where regular 
post offices are located. The reimbursement from the USF will be towards Net 
Cost that may arise if the PTICs are engineered by upgrading an existing 
VPT, with the minimum configuration of i) a PC, ii) a Modem and iii) an UPS. 
Both capital and operational cost will be taken into account to determine the 
quantum of support from USF. A phased programme will be drawn and 
implemented to upgrade about 35,000 VPTs to function as PTICs by end of 
year 2004.  
 e)  Installation of High Speed PTICs (HPTICs) by upgrading the existing VPTs 
to provide wide band applications like tele-education and tele-medicine 
based on two basic channels i.e. 128 Kbps. In the first phase by 2004, about 2 
HPTICs shall be set up in each SDCA, Both capital and operational costs will 
be taken into account to determine the quantum of support from USF.  
 
 B) Stream-II: Provision of household telephones in Net High cost areas 
(rural/remote) 
 
For Stream II, the cost of service in the SDCAs will comprise the capital recovery and 
operating expenses in respect of the access network, developed for DELs installed 
after the specified date. Per line net cost will be worked out on the basis of SDCA 
average. At the beginning of each Financial Year, the service providers would 
indicate their SDCA-wise roll out plan including projected cost and revenue. The 
rural SDCA as per list issued by Department of Telecommunication shall be treated 
as rural SDCA for this purpose. The subsidy will be automatically withdrawn as soon 
as any SDCA’s net cost becomes zero i.e., it becomes a revenue surplus area.  
 
v)  While the implementation of stream-I and stream-II would be simultaneous, stream-
I, i.e. stream relating to provision of common access (VPTs & PTICs) will receive 
priority. However, the support (towards OPEX only) to rural household DELs 
provided prior to 1.4.2002 in the rural SDCAs shall be given along with stream-I. 
(Amendment dated 3.2.2003) 
vi)  The details as required and decided by DOT shall be furnished by the BSOs in regard 
to installation of Rural Community Phones and Replacement of VPTs by such dates 
as may be determined from time to time by DOT. These shall amongst others include 
number of VPTs to be replaced/installed with details of their locations, technology 
employed, distance from exchange and Average Revenue per VPT etc.  
vii)  The implementation of Universal Service Obligation shall be through a multi-layered 
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first round of bidding will be amongst the existing Access providers (BSOs and 
CMSPs) of the concerned Service area. Where no bids are received from any of the 
BSOs/ CMSPs in the concerned service area, or the lowest bid is higher than the 
benchmark, then a fresh round of bidding shall be called from where all the BSOs 
and CMSPs in the country including the ones in the concerned service area as well as 
their franchisees. However, the award of contract as a result of bidding process will 
not be treated and taken as grant of fresh license under Indian Telegraph Act 1885.  
viii)  The existing Service Areas as defined in the Basic Services Licenses shall be the unit 
of bidding for US support. The bids shall be called for separately, for each Service 
Area or part thereof.  
ix)  The lowest bid, offering the least subsidy shall be accepted subject to a ceiling of the 
benchmark cost as determined by DOT. A subsidy higher than the benchmark shall 
not be accepted, and may either call for negotiations or further round of bidding.  
(x)  For calculation and estimating benchmark cost, fully allocated current costs method 
shall be adopted, considering the most effective solution for a particular location/ 
area. For operating expenses, the costs will be calculated on the basis of operations 
run most efficiently.  
(xi)  A separate fund for crediting the receipts towards USO is being set up and will be 
presently administered by the DoT.  
xii)  The Universal Service Support shall be reimbursed on the basis of the actual physical 
performance. Such reimbursements shall be made on completion of the targets & 
after necessary verification of the same. Liquidated Damages shall be imposed in 
accordance with devised scheme for any shortfall in the achievement of targets.  
xiii)  The DoT or its authorized representative shall have the right to inspect the sites used 
for extending the service. 
xiv)  The DoT will ordinarily carry out all inspections after reasonable notice except in 
circumstances where giving of notice is not feasible or will defeat the very purpose of 
inspection. In such event, an inspection will be undertaken without prior notice.  
xv)  The DoT reserves the right to modify these guidelines or incorporate new guidelines 
considered necessary in public interest, security, and for proper conduct of 
telegraphs.  
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(i) The bidding process has been structured as “Multi-layered Informed Descending 
Bidding Process.”  The pre-qualification bid along with EMBG and the first Financial 
Bid will be submitted by the bidders in separate sealed covers.  The first Financial 
Bids of those who qualify shall be opened and shall be made public in the presence of 
bidders’ authorized representatives, carrying such authority/document with them. 
 
(ii) The bidders can offer less than or equal to the Benchmark for the front    loaded 
subsidy Offers higher than the Benchmark for the front-loaded subsidy or where all 
the specified SDCAs in a SSA have not been bid for, shall not be treated as a valid 
bid. 
 
(iii)     The lowest valid offer for an SSA will determine the reserve price for the front loaded 
subsidy for each SDCA in a SSA for the second round. If there are more than four 
pre-qualified bidders for a SSA, the highest bidder will be dropped and others will 
qualify for the second round of financial bidding.  If pre-qualified bidders are four or 
less, all will qualify for second round of financial bidding.  If there is only one bidder 
with a valid bid, then that bidder will be declared as the successful bidder and there 
shall be no further round of bidding. 
 
(iv)     The bidders, except those last dropped, shall submit a Second Financial Bid for the 
second round.  The bid amount in the second round will have to be equal to or lower 
than the ‘Reserve Price’ for each of the SDCA in the SSA and the bidder(s) quoting 
above the Reserve Price shall be disqualified for further round of bidding. 
 
(v)    All the bidders who have quoted less than or equal to  the ‘Reserve Price’ for the 
front loaded subsidy  for each of the  SDCAs in  a SSA in the second round of 
financial bidding will be short-listed.  If there are three or more such short-listed 
bidders in a SSA, except the highest bidder, the rest will qualify for the third round of 
financial bidding. In case there are two bidders, both will qualify for the third round 
of financial bidding. In case there is only one short-listed bidder, then that bidder will 
be declared the successful bidder and there will be no further round of bidding. 
 
(vi)  The lowest valid offer for an SSA will determine the Reserve Price for the front 
loaded subsidy for each SDCA within an SSA for the third round. The bidders, who 
qualify for bidding for the third and final round, shall be required to submit the third 
and final bid for all specified SDCAs within a SSA for which they have qualified in 
the previous round.  The bidder of the final round of financial bidding with the 
lowest offer for a SSA will be declared successful for signing of the Agreement. 
 
(vii) In case of a tie in the conclusive round of bidding, the bidder who quoted lower 
amount in the previous round for a SSA shall be declared successful for signing of 
the Agreement. 
 
(viii) In the event of a tie in the previous bidding for selection, the process of bidding will 
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(ix) The signing of Agreement as a result of bidding process will not be treated and taken 
as grant of fresh License under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. 
 
(x) If the Agreement is not signed with the successful bidder for whatsoever reason, the 
Administrator may decide to continue with the present bidding process till it is 
completed and the Agreement is signed with the successful bidder. 
 
(xi) In every successive round of bidding, the bidders can only lower or retain the front 
loaded subsidy of their last bid. Withdrawal or backing out of their last quoted front 
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License fee of various telecom operators 
Type of License Annual License Fee 
(% AGR) 
Annual license fees excluding 
present level of USO 
Cellular Mobile* 
Basic Service 
Unified Access Service 
Type A – 10%  
Type B – 8% 
Type C – 6% / 5% 
Type A – 5%  
Type B – 3% 
Type C – 1% / 0% 
National Long Distance 15% 10% 
International Long Distance 15% 10% 
Global Mobile Communication by 
satellite 
10% 5% 
VSAT 10% 5% 
Infrastructure Providers Cat II 15% 10% 
Radio Paging Service Providers 5% 0% 
Public Mobile Radio Trunked 
Service 
5% 0% 
Internet Service Providers 0% 0% 
Infrastructure Providers Cat I 0% 0% 
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Increased Revenues of Government after revenue share was introduced due 
to higher growth rate in mobile services 
Statement of Revenue to be received by Central Government 








II TP 99) 
License Fee 
as per 2001 
Regime 
License Fee 







1 1999-00 1603 275 209  110 319 
2 2000-01 2270 619 468  248 716 
3 2001-02 2734 793 602  317 919 
4 2002-03 2455 872 657  349 1006 
5 2003-04 2470 1727 1296  1105 2402 
6 2004-05 2511 2698  1666 1727 3392 
7 2005-06 2591 4586  2831 2935 5766 
8 2006-07 2680 7796  4813 4989 9802 
  19314 19366 3234 9309 11780 24323 
    12543   
Note:  Rate of Service Tax taken as 5% up to 13.5.2003 & 8% thereafter (presently 10%) 






Regulatory Levies on mobile services in some developing countries 
 Pakistan Sri Lanka China India 
Regulatory Charges %age of revenue %age %age of revenue %age of revenue 
Service Tax, GST GST VAT 3% 8% + GST 
License Fee 0.5% + 0.5% R&D 0.3% turnover 




Spectrum Charge Cost recovery ~ 1.1% of t.o. ~0.5%**  
(China Mobile) 
2~6%* 
USO 1.5% Nil (only on ISD 
calls) 
Nil Incl in license fees 
Total Regulatory 
charges 
2.5% + GST + cost 
recovery 
=1.3% t.o. +1%  
inv + VAT 
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Statement of Estimate of Government Levis from License Fee, Spectrum Fee 
and Service Tax on Telecom Services 
Rs. Crores 

















2002-03 48000 7200 40800 4080 2040 206 6326 
2003-04 61000 9150 51850 4770 4148 434 9353 
2004-05 80000 12000 68000 6256 6800 856 13912 
2005-06 100000 15000 85000 7820 8500 1530 17850 
Notes:  
*Weighted Average License fee of Industry is 9.2% and applied on Adjusted Gross revenue. License Fee for Basic 
telephone, Cellular Mobile, NLD, ILD, Internet services etc. varies from 0% to 15%. 
#Service Tax applied on Adjusted Gross revenue as it is not charged on Interconnection Usage Charges, etc. Service 
Tax rate for 2002-03 – 5%, 2003-04-8%, 2004-05 & 2005-06 – 10%. 
&Spectrum Fee varies from 2% to 4%, depending on amount of allocated spectrum. Weighted Average Spectrum 
Fee for years 2002-03 to 2005-06 is estimated as 3%, 3.4%, 3.8% and 4% respectively. Contribution of Adjusted 
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